Firm Size Wage Differentials in Switzerland: Evidence from Job Changers by Winter-Ebmer, Rudolf & Zweimüller, Josef
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics
University of Zurich
Working Paper Series
ISSN 1424-0459
Published in:
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceeding, Vol.89, No. 2, May 1999, 89-93
Working Paper No. 1
Firm Size Wage Differentials in Switzerland:
Evidence from Job Changers
Rudolf Winter-Ebmer and Josef Zweimüller
February 1999
Firm Size Wage Differentials in Switzerland: Evidence from Job Changers
By Rudolf Winter-Ebmer and Josef Zweimüller∗
forthcoming in:
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1999.
Abstract.
Using information on job changes and search behavior of workers and controlling for endogenous
mobility we study firm-size wage differentials in Switzerland. We find that the observed cross-
sectional firm size premium cannot be explained exclusively by worker heterogeneity. Almost 50
% of the cross-section differential is a firm-size effect.
Economists have long been interested in the influence of employer size on the structure of wages.
Yet there is little consensus in the literature about the particular reason why the size of a firm
should be a determinant of a worker’s wage rate. The seminal work of Charles Brown and James
Medoff (1989) provides only weak evidence for the traditional explanation which relies on size-
differences in the quality of labor or size-differences in working conditions. However, recently
John Abowd, Francis Kramarz and David Margolis (1999, forthcoming) found that individual
heterogeneity rather than firm heterogeneity accounts for almost all the wage variation between
detailed size categories. They used a large matched firm-worker sample from France and isolated
fixed individual and fixed firm effects from workers moving between employers.1 The well
known problem with the fixed-effects estimate – which applies also to the latter study - is the
implicit assumption that job changes are exogenous. A large part of worker mobility is however
voluntary and this self-selection causes the fixed-effect estimate in general to be inconsistent.2
We try to add to this literature by not only studying wage changes of workers who move
between firms of different size classes but also by explicitly analyzing the underlying mobility
decisions. Our analysis is based on a new data-set for Switzerland. Studying the Swiss labor
market is interesting because it is rather non-European as far as labor market institutions are
concerned. In particular, unions are weak, membership and coverage are low, and employment
protection measures are not far-reaching. Nevertheless, the Swiss labor market resembles a
typical continental-European country in terms of low and rather stable wage inequality and in
terms of a distribution of employment which is skewed towards small and medium sized firms.
According to the Swiss Labor Force Survey (SLFS) roughly 30 % of all employees are working
in firms with more than 100 employees. Moreover, there is only detailed information on firm size
for enterprises with less than 100 employees. The focus of this paper will therefore be on
employer-size wage differences in small and medium-sized enterprises.3
In the next section we briefly describe the data and display preliminary evidence on the
employer-size wage gap in Switzerland. Section II focuses on wage growth of job changers with
particular reference to endogenous mobility. Section III presents evidence on actual mobility
choices of workers and studies search activities of workers by employer size. Section IV
concludes. We find no evidence for the hypothesis that larger employers provide worse working
conditions. We do however find some support for the labor quality explanation.
I. The Employer-Size Wage Gap in Switzerland
The SLFS is a yearly survey covering a representative sample of Swiss households over the years
1991-1996. The survey is constructed as a 5-year rotating panel providing information not only
on year-to-year job mobility but also on on-the-job search activities of workers. This can be taken
as an indicator of individual job-satisfaction.
In a first step, we ran a standard OLS-wage regression using dummies for four firm-size
categories with a roughly equal employment share. The results are displayed in equation (1)
(employer-size less than 5 employees serves as the reference, standard errors are in brackets
below the coefficients):4
(1) ln wi = ... + 0.046 * size 5-10 + 0.095 * size 11-99 + 0.129 * size 100-
                  (0.008)                    (0.007)                      (0.007)
where wi is the gross hourly wage rate. The OLS-size premium between two consecutive size
classes is roughly 4 percentage points. Running the same regression but using the fixed-effects
estimator leads to a strong reduction of the firm-size premia.
(2) ln wi = ... –0.010* size 5-10 + 0.025 * size 11-99 + 0.030 * size 100-
                  (0.010)                (0.010)                      (0.011)
Equation (2) shows that the firm-size effect shrinks to less than a third of the OLS-estimate, once
we control for fixed individual effects. Consequently and in line with Abowd et al. (1999,
forthcoming) one is lead to conclude that by far the most part of the OLS firm-size effect is due
to individual heterogeneity.
One potentially important problem with fixed-effects estimates is measurement error, which
would worsen the signal-to-noise ratio and attenuate estimated coefficients. In our case, the low
number of size categories should minimize this error. On the other hand, the fixed-effect estimate
identifies the size effect from both job stayers with a changing firm size and from movers
between firms of different size-classes. We consider the measurement error to be more severe for
size-class changing workers who stayed with the same firm, than for job-changers as the former
may result from mere legal changes, mergers, plant/establishment measurement problems, etc.
Also Brown and Medoff  (1989, p. 1038) found no impact of firm size on wages in the fixed-
effect estimate for job-stayers, but a significant size differential among movers. In what follows,
we will therefore concentrate our analysis on job changers. In particular, we consider the OLS-
size premium as a distinct determinant of individual wages and ask how this wage-component
affects the dynamics of individual wages and the mobility and search behavior of workers.
II. Wage Growth of Job-Movers Between Size-Classes
Table 1 presents evidence on wage growth for job-changers. If  the OLS estimate in equation (1)
measures a true size effect, a worker changing, say, from size class 100- to size class 11-99
would suffer a wage reduction of 12.9 - 9.5 = 3.4 %. Denote by αk the OLS coefficient for size
class k, and  by ∆αkj the expected wage change of a worker changing from class k to j, where
∆αkj = αj - αk. These variables are included as regressors in Table 1. The estimated coefficient of
∆αkj has a simple and meaningful interpretation in the wage growth equation. It indicates what
fraction of the cross-sectional size wage component a worker takes with her when moving
between class categories. For instance, a coefficient of 1 means that a worker moving between
class 11-99 and 100- experiences a wage growth of 3.4 % as suggested by the OLS-regression.
The results indicate that actual wage growth for job-changers is a significant fraction of the
wage growth suggested by the OLS-estimate. If individual characteristics are not controlled for
(column 1) this fraction is about 52 %. If controls are included, the corresponding fraction is
roughly 43 %. This is considerably larger than the fixed-effect estimates in equation (2).
As mentioned above, when the endogeneity of mobility is not accounted for, the estimated
firm-size coefficients are in general inconsistent. In order to study how mobility choices could
affect our results we first looked at a possible asymmetry in wage changes between those
individuals who moved to a larger firm as opposed to those who moved to a smaller firm (column
3). Individuals moving to a larger firm experience an increase in the wage of roughly 40 % of the
cross-sectional size-gap, whereas the decline in wages of those moving to a smaller firm is about
45 % of the estimate predicted by OLS. The difference is not statistically significant. Such high
wage losses are remarkable given the supposedly high downward wage rigidity in Europe. They
are also difficult to reconcile with voluntary job-moves.
 A similar result arises, once we distinguish between leavers and joiners of a size class
(column 4). It turns out that leavers have to give up about 38 % the cross-section firm-size wage
component and joiners gain about 47 %. Again, no significant difference between joiners and
leavers can be detected.
The results in column 3 and 4 of the upper part of Table 1 give some informal tests about the
potential importance of self-selection into different size classes. In the lower panel of Table 1, we
redo the analysis but formally account for possible selectivity effects by applying Heckman’s
two-stage selectivity-correction. The selection equation is solidly identified, as we use levels of
the covariates in the selection equation but changes in the wage growth equation. The coefficients
in Table 1 only change marginally while the general picture remains. Individual heterogeneity
seems to be of some importance for the employer-size wage gap. However, almost half of the
OLS size wage premium is still captured by workers who change firm size categories.5
III. Job Search and Mobility by Firm Size
Further insights into the causes of measured firm-size wage differentials can be gained by
looking at revealed behavior of workers. By her decision to look for a new job or to change the
job, the worker reveals information about her job satisfaction.
The upper panel of Table 2 presents results on the impact of firm size as such and firm size
wage premiums αk on job-search activities of workers. If observed wage differences by firm size
are due to differences in working conditions (more rules, a less autonomous and more impersonal
work atmosphere, etc.) then observed wage differentials should be utility-equalizing and no
systematic differences in search-behavior across firm-size classes should be observed. Moreover,
conditional on the individual wage, lower job satisfaction in larger firms should induce higher
on-the-job-search activities in larger firms than in smaller ones.
The results show a clear picture: Irrespective of conditioning on the current wage, workers
employed in larger firms are significantly less likely to look for another job. Controlling for the
wage (Column 3) leads to a somewhat smaller effect, without changing the general picture. Note
that the individual’s wage also has a negative – but considerably smaller – impact on on-the-job
search behavior than firm size as measured by the cross-sectional firm-size premium. As the own
wage might pick up job rents as well as returns to unobserved human capital – which should not
lead to higher quit rates -, a smaller effect is to be expected. Columns 4 and 5 serve as robustness
checks for the influence of current wage rates and the size premium.
The lower panel of Table 2 provides evidence on actual job mobility of workers.6 Here we
find qualitatively the same results. The quantitative impact is however somewhat lower in the
job-change analysis. The difference between the firm-size impact on search and its impact on
actual worker mobility lies primarily in the fact that the former variable is the outcome of a
voluntary choice of the worker whereas the latter could be the result either of a (voluntary) quit or
an (involuntary) layoff. Based on our analysis of workers‘ search and mobility behavior we are
lead to conclude that if anything larger firms offer better working conditions than smaller firms.
Todd Idson (1996) mentions the importance of better promotion expectations, fringe benefits and
more job security (due to a lower risk of bankruptcy of larger firms) as well as the importance of
intra-firm job mobility as possible explanations for such a result.
IV. Conclusions
Using information on job changes and search behavior of workers and controlling for endogenous
mobility we conclude that firm-size wage differentials in Switzerland cannot be explained by job
heterogeneity. About half of the differential – the size of which is comparable to the one in the
U.S.– is accounted for by worker heterogeneity. This fraction is lower than in recent matched
employer-employee data studies using fixed effects (Abowd et al, 1999 forthcoming, Leonard
and Van Audenrode, 1995). This may result from their assumption of exogenous job changes, but
also from relatively poor information on worker characteristics like schooling. This may place
greater emphasis on individual heterogeneity as compared to firm heterogeneity in the
determination of wages (Daniel S. Hamermesh, 1999 forthcoming).
Table 1: Wage growth among job changers7
1 2 3 4
Change in size premium ∆αkj
0.515
(0.168)
0.426
(0.169) - -
Change in size premium
- positive change (∆αkj >0) - -
0.395
(0.281) -
- negative change  (∆αkj <0) - -
0.454
(0.260) -
Size premium current firm αj - - -
0.474
(0.200)
Size premium old firm αk - - -
-0.379
(0.200)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
2
R 0.003 0.017 0.017 0.017
Prob. value for inequality of
coefficients - - 0.89 0.66
N 2779 2738 2738 2738
Controlling for sample selectivity 5 6 7 8
Expected change in size premium ∆αkj
0.469
(0.172)
0.381
(0.176) - -
Expected change in size premium
- positive change (∆αkj >0) - -
0.249
(0.306) -
- negative change (∆αkj <0) - -
0.481
(0.259) -
Size premium current firm αj - - -
0.502
(0.203)
Size premium old firm αk - - -
-0.240
(0.212)
Controls No Yes Yes Yes
2
R 0.004 0.023 0.023 0.023
Prob. value for inequality of
coefficients - - 0.60 0.24
N 2655 2640 2640 2640
Table 2: On-the-job search and mobility of workers8
On-the-job search (0,1)
1 2 3 4 5
Size premium in current
firm αk
-0.131
(0.028) -
-0.106
(0.029) - -
Wage in current firm - - -0.023(0.003)
-0.025
(0.003)
-0.025
(0.003)
Firm size 5-10 (0,1) - -0.001(0.004) -
0.001
(0.001) -
Firm size 11-99   (0,1) - -0.007(0.004) -
-0.005
(0.002) -
Firm size 100-   (0,1) - -0.014(0.004) -
-0.011
(0.004) -
Observations 37265 37265 37265 37265 37265
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.073 0.078 0.076 0.077
Mean of LHS variable 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079
Worker changed job within one year (0,1)
1 2 3 4 5
Size premium in old firm αk
-0.086
(0.020) -
-0.081
(0.020) - -
Wage in old firm - - -0.006(0.002)
-0.006
(0.002)
-0.005
(0.002)
Firm size 5-10 (0,1) - -0.001(0.003) -
0.002
(0.003) -
Firm size 11-99   (0,1) - -0.003(0.002) -
-0.004
(0.002) -
Firm size 100-   (0,1) - -0.007(0.003) -
-0.009
(0.003) -
Observations 37318 37318 37318 37318 37318
Pseudo R2 0.159 0.156 0.157 0.159 0.156
Mean of LHS variable 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.080
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dummies and 9 broad industry dummies.
5 It has to be noted that the variable „firm size wage premium“ is based on regression coefficients which may lead to
an errors-in-variables problem. This possible bias of the estimated coefficients towards zero only reinforces the point
that heterogeneity of workers cannot the sole explanation for size-wage differentials.
6 See Winter-Ebmer (1996) for a related analysis for Austria.
7 The dependent variable is ln wit – ln wit-1, control variables include tenure in the old job, a square in age as well
changes in on- and off-the-job training, temporary contract, working time, supervisory status and in 9 broad industry
categories. The sample selection equation is identified by the use of level variables instead of changes as in the wage
growth equation.
8 Results from pooled probit regressions (random effects probits gave very similar results), coefficients are marginal
effects evaluated at means of all independent variables. Further controls include squared terms in age and tenure,
years of schooling, dummies for on- and off-the-job training, for gender, nationality, family and supervisor status,
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